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Information Sharing with Key Suppliers:  
 A Transaction Cost Theory Perspective 
 
Introduction 
 
Although, much has been written about the merits of interfirm collaboration, i.e. how 
it affects company and supply chain performances (e.g. Li et al., 2006; Bagchi and Skjoett-
Larsen, 2005; Petersen et al., 2005; Saeed et al., 2005; Fröhlich and Westbrook, 2001), only a 
few studies attempt to explain why collaboration efforts across organizations differ and are 
somewhat limited (e.g. Zhou and Benton 2007; Li and Lin, 2006, Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen, 
2002; Wagner 2003). Since collaboration is important due to its desirable effects on company 
performance, a thorough investigation into the forces that drive collaboration is essential. 
Hence, this paper is motivated by the shortcomings in the existing literature in explaining why 
certain buyers and sellers in supply chains collaborate more intensely than others. The main 
objective of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework with which the recent 
developments in supply chains with regard to collaboration and integration can be interpreted. 
The results of the study could also be helpful to practitioners who are considering 
collaboration or who are already collaborating with exchange partners by discussing the 
critical issues raised by the topic.    
 
One could argue that the stream of research investigating interfirm collaboration 
gained momentum with the development of advanced interorganizational information systems 
that are enabled through private or public networks such as the Internet. Often, these 
technologies are promoted together with supply chain philosophies such as Collaborative 
Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment and Advanced Planning and Scheduling, which 
engage multiple parties in decision-making on issues such as inventory management and 
capacity planning. There seems to be a pay-off for investing resources into these schemes as 
recent studies found empirical evidence about a positive relationship between various forms 
of collaboration and company/supply chain performance (e.g. Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen, 
2005; Petersen et al., 2005; Saeed et al., 2005; Li et al., 2006). These findings support the 
conventional wisdom in supply chain literature that the more integration there is, the better 
the performance (Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen, 2005). Despite this view, companies have been 
somewhat slow and hesitant to adopt collaborative supply chain practices and their supporting 
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technologies (Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen, 2005; Kemppainen and Vepsäläinen, 2003). Could 
this be explained through the existence of a different view – that companies should go for 
limited or selective collaboration as there is a risk of integrated systems and processes being 
obsolete once they are created (Bask and Juga, 2001)? Although existing theory gives some 
indication on the factors that might influence the decision of companies to collaborate with 
for example a key supplier (e.g. trust), there is a lack of empirical evidence. 
  
First of all, it will be beneficial to define and clarify some key concepts, which are 
often used interchangeably in the literature. The Webster Dictionary defines cooperation “as 
the association of persons for common benefit”. For Spekman et al. (1998) cooperation is the 
first level of integration in the supply chain followed by co-ordination and collaboration. 
According to Alter (1999), integration itself refers to the level of goals, culture, and 
information shared with the other partner. Co-ordination in the words of Spekman et al., 
(1998:55) is  
 
“whereby both specified workflow and information is exchanged in a 
manner that permits JIT systems, EDI , and other mechanisms that attempt 
to make seamless many of the traditional linkages between and among 
trading parties.”    
 
The unit of analysis for this paper is information sharing as it is the most essential and 
common element in any integration and collaboration effort between two companies. In this 
study, information sharing between firms refers to information shared between a buyer and 
key suppliers that is detailed enough, frequent enough (Carr and Smeltzer, 2002; Humphreys 
et al., 2004; Krause and Ellram, 1997), and timely enough (Dyer, 1997; Krause and Ellram, 
1997; Leek et al., 2003) to meet a firm’s requirements. Here, the scope of information is much 
broader than the information exchanged between buyers and sellers for transaction processing 
purposes. Hence, in the reminder of this paper, information sharing will refer to the sharing of 
private and discretionary information, what is beyond the information required to carry out 
the day-to-day transactions between buyers and sellers. This study focuses on information 
sharing with key suppliers as opposed to customers or both in order to limit the scope of the 
study. However, the results of the study are also very likely to be applicable to the customer 
side. 
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Information sharing: A transaction cost theory perspective 
 
 
Transaction cost theory could serve as a good starting point for the analysis, which 
explains why certain tasks are performed by firms and others by markets (Coase, 1937). 
Transaction costs can be divided into coordination costs and transaction risk (Clemons and 
Row, 1992). “Coordination costs are the direct costs of integrating decisions between 
economic activities [such as search and bargaining costs]. Transaction risk is associated with 
the exposure to being exploited in the relationship” (Clemons and Row 1992:3). Uncertainty 
and asset specificity are two factors, which increase coordination costs and transaction risk 
respectively (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  
 
The use of Information Technology has facilitated the reduction of coordination costs, 
which has been extensively documented in the literature (e.g. Bakos, 1991; Cash and 
Konsynski, 1985; Johnston and Vitale, 1988). For example, electronic market places, 
facilitated through IT, reduce the cost of searching for obtaining information about product 
offerings and prices (Bakos, 1991). Also collaboration facilitated by information sharing can 
lower transaction costs (in particular coordination costs) as companies can thereby reduce 
supply chain uncertainty and thus the cost of contracting. This can be explained with an 
example: If a supplier is unable to accurately predict the price of its product inputs, it will be 
reluctant to enter into a contract, which locks it into a fixed price for an extended period of 
time (Artz and Brush, 2000).   
 
Uncertainty in the context of supply chains and more specifically in manufacturing is 
caused by supply uncertainty, demand uncertainty, new product development uncertainty, and 
technology uncertainty (Koh and Tan, 2006). Supply uncertainty relates to unpredictable 
events that occur in the upstream part of the supply chain. Among the causes to supply 
uncertainty are shortages of materials and late deliveries. Clearly, supply uncertainty can 
disrupt manufacturing and have an adverse affect on sales, where distributors and retailers 
down the chain are also affected. Demand uncertainty can be defined as unpredictable events 
that occur in the downstream part of the supply chain (Koh and Tan, 2006). Demand 
uncertainty (or demand risk) can result from seasonality, volatility of fads, new product 
adoptions or short product life cycles (Juttner, 2005). Furthermore, Chung, Anthony, and 
Michael (2004) identify three sources for the uncertainty of demand arising (i) from the final 
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consumer, (ii) the behavior of the economic system at the current time, and (iii) the immediate 
downstream customers. Another uncertainty related to manufacturing concerns new product 
development. New product development uncertainty can stem from unpredictable events 
during the process of market research, product design, and product prototyping. Finally, 
technology uncertainty refers to the fuzziness in the selection of a suitable technology 
platform (Koh and Tan, 2006). An example is the trade-off between a fool-proof 
manufacturing technology (perhaps dated), compared to a prospective technology offering 
better price to performance but whose viability is not certain (Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 
2002). Furthermore, uncertainty can also arise from political (e.g. fuel crisis), natural (e.g. 
fire, earthquake), and social uncertainties (e.g. strikes) (Juttner, 2005).  
     
Approaching the concept of uncertainty from the transaction cost economics (TCE) point of 
view might provide further insight into the value of information sharing between 
organizations. The concept of uncertainty is central to TCE, which assumes that individuals 
have bounded rationality and act opportunistically. The early transaction cost literature did 
not make a distinction between different forms of uncertainty. More recent literature has 
disaggregated the construct of uncertainty (Meuleman et al., 2006). For example, Williamson 
(1985), who built on Koopmans (1957), distinguished between primary and behavioral (or 
secondary) uncertainty. Primary uncertainty refers to the underlying transaction and arises 
from mainly exogenous sources such as uncertainty relating to natural events, consumer 
preferences, regulations, and technology (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). Primary uncertainty 
may lead to problems of communication, technological difficulties, and coordination 
problems that can as a consequence adversely impact the execution of transactions 
(Meuleman et al., 2006). Behavioral uncertainty refers to the risk of opportunism on 
transactions that are executed through incomplete contracts.  
 
Similarly, Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998), classified uncertainty as primary, competitive, and 
supplier uncertainty. Primary uncertainty is consistent with Koopmans’ (1957) and 
Williamson’s (1985) and refers to the “lack of knowledge of states of nature” (Sutcliffe and 
Zaheer 1998:6). Competitive uncertainty arises from the innocent or strategic actions of 
potential or actual competitors (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). Supplier uncertainty is essentially 
behavioral uncertainty and refers to possible opportunism by upstream or downstream 
partners. In organizational theory uncertainty is often referred to as environmental uncertainty 
(Thompson, 1967) and includes a number of factors such as uncertainty regarding suppliers 
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and competitors actions, as well as uncertainty in regulations and technology, which captures 
both primary and behavioral uncertainty. Based on the reviewed literature, the definitions of 
the various types of uncertainty are not consistent. Some definitions overlap, whereas others 
ignore certain factors.  
 
The presence of demand uncertainty and the lack of information sharing in the supply 
chain can lead to a problem known as the bullwhip effect: the amplification of demand 
variability as orders move up the supply chain (Forrester, 1958; Lee et al., 1997). Jones and 
Simmons (2000) provide evidence for this finding from the food industry, whereas Naim, 
Disney, and Evans (2002) report on the bullwhip effect in the automotive sector. There are 
four sources of the bullwhip effect: (i) demand signal processing, (ii) rationing game, (iii) 
order batching, and (iv) price fluctuations (Lee et al., 1997). The bullwhip effect can be 
alleviated through sharing demand information in the supply chain, which reduces 
information asymmetry and uncertainty (Lee et al., 1997). Thus, limiting uncertainty through 
information sharing can in turn reduce companies’ internal risk as companies’ can optimize 
inventory, production, and capacity planning. Although, information sharing seems to bring 
with it many benefits, it can simultaneously increase transaction risk, as higher levels of 
business transparency can lead to opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, uncertainty as a factor 
might affect companies’ incentives to share information. This also agrees with contingency 
theory, which states that the amount of uncertainty and rate of change in an environment 
affects the development of internal features in organizations (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  
 
With respect to the sign of the relationship between uncertainty and information sharing, 
the literature is ambiguous. Fisher (1997) and Kaufman and Mohtadi (2003) claim that there 
is a negative relationship between uncertainty and information sharing. Kaufman and Mohtadi 
(2003, p. 28) argue, “information sharing and information withholding might take place 
depending on the degree of initial uncertainty”. On the other hand, Xu (1996) argues that 
manufacturers will find it more difficult to plan when demand is more variable, encouraging 
them to share more information. The relationship between uncertainty (demand uncertainty in 
Kulp, 2002 and environmental uncertainty in Li and Lin, 2006) and information sharing 
(operationalized as the extent of Vendor Managed Inventory in Kulp) was previously 
hypothesized but no support was found. However, a more recent study by Zhou and Benton 
(2007) did find support for a relationship between supply chain dynamism and information 
sharing. As evident from the literature, supply chain uncertainty refers to many aspects of the 
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supply chain, which can be classified as demand and environmental uncertainties. Demand 
uncertainty refers to the characteristics of demand that the company’s products face such as 
the rate of product introductions and product demand. Environmental uncertainty is broader 
and is concerned with issues such as supplier actions, customer demands and macroeconomic 
factors. Based on the theory and previous research, we formulate the following two 
hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Environmental uncertainty is positively related to the intensity of 
information shared with key suppliers.  
Hypothesis 2: Demand uncertainty is positively related to the intensity of information 
shared with key suppliers.  
 
The relational view of the firm suggests that buying and supplying firms systematically share 
valuable know-how with each other and make relationship-specific investments in return for 
access to profit from rents that can only be generated by working jointly (Dyer and Singh 
1998). However, exchange and investment in relationship-specific assets will take place under 
conditions where the expected value of the combined inflows of knowledge and investment 
exceeds the expected loss/erosion of advantages due to knowledge spill-overs to competitors 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Osborn and Hagedorn, 1997). Asset specificity refers to the degree of 
investment made by the supplier of goods and/or services for a specific buyer (Williamson, 
1985). Asset specific investments include site specificity, physical asset specificity, human 
asset specificity and dedicated assets (Williamson, 1993). As investments in assets are 
specific and cannot be put to work without a significant loss for other purposes, increasing 
asset specific investments can put an exchange partner into greater (transaction) risk. A buyer 
that observes its supplier having no alternative buyers due to asset specific investments can 
use its monopoly power to demand, for example, a price reduction. There is a well-known 
case study of Fisher Body (FB) and General Motors (GM) where a buyer goes into extreme 
measures and purchases the supplier due to asset specific investments (Klein et al., 1978). In 
other cases, involved parties may request additional safeguards through penalties for 
premature termination, information disclosure and verification mechanisms, and specialized 
dispute settlement, which lead to market supported hybrid contracting (Williamson 2008).  
 
Asset specificity can be regarded as a lock-in or as some degree of dependency on the 
other firm. Dependency between companies is a function of the criticality of the resource 
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(Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Bourantas, 1989, Sririam et al., 1992) and 
availability of alternative suppliers and/or buyers (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Sririam et al., 1992; Geyskens et al., 1996; Kim, 2001; Buvik and Halskau, 2001). 
When a company is dependent on another, the concept of “power” might arise. In fact, power 
has been used as a factor to explain the adoption of EDI, which facilitates information sharing 
(Hart and Saunders, 1997; Webster 1995). In the economic context, power is defined “as the 
ability to influence the intentions and actions of another firm” (Emerson 1962). The term 
power itself is not very informative, as the source for power requires some explanation. 
According to Emerson (1962), the basis for power is dependency. Thus, this study focuses on 
the concept of dependency rather than power.  
 
Switching costs have also been found to play a role in determining the level of 
dependency (Bourantas, 1989; Sririam et al., 1992; Johnson, 1999; Buvik and Halskau, 2001) 
between firms. Switching costs are those costs incurred when having to switch from one 
supplier to another when purchasing the same goods. The costs might be both monetary (labor 
time spent) and non-monetary (including routines and procedures for dealing with a particular 
supplier) (Dick and Basu, 1994; Heide and Weiss, 1995). When dependency is high as a result 
of asset specific investments and/or switching costs, companies might be forced to share more 
information by the more powerful partner. Alternatively, an exchange partner might attempt 
to gain the trust of another partner by sharing information, which can be seen as a 
commitment into the relationship (Spekman et al. 1998). Thus, we formulate the following 
hypotheses, which were previously not tested.   
 
Hypothesis 3: A key supplier’s dependence on the buyer is positively related to the 
intensity of information shared with key supplier. 
Hypothesis 4: A buyer’s dependence on the key supplier is positively related to the 
intensity of information shared with the key supplier. 
 
Information can be viewed as an asset (King, 1984). The provision of private information 
can then be regarded as an asset invested into the exchange relationship. This is comparable to 
an asset specific investment. However, this “investment” as opposed to the classical view of 
asset specificity does not necessarily make the invested asset (information) less useful when 
employed elsewhere. Furthermore, the provision of private information is not mandatory; it is 
likely to be voluntary to enhance transactions. However, similar to an asset specific 
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investment, it might lead to a power shift in the bargaining position of the involved parties 
due to opening the possibility for opportunism. The investment (or risk of opportunism) can 
be regarded as a negative investment being equal to the net present value (NPV) of the future 
losses of financial benefits in case of opportunism. Hence, companies will share information 
only up to the point where the benefits of sharing information will be equal to or greater than 
the NPV of future losses due to opportunism. In reality, companies will find it hard to 
quantify the benefits and the risks of information sharing and decisions might have to be 
made based on rules of thumb rather than marginal analysis.  
 
Information in the wrong hands or when abused can expose a company to risk. For 
example, a supplier that knows its buyer’s upcoming production might increase the price of 
direct materials as the buyer is now in a weaker position. On the other hand, a buyer might 
demand a lower price from a key supplier if the excess supplier inventory is known, leading 
to risk of obsolescence if not purchased and utilized soon enough. Also unintentional harm 
can arise from information sharing in the form of spillovers to competitors.   
 
Given the risk of information sharing, the role of trust, which has been extensively 
studied in interorganizational relationships (e.g. Neuman and Samuels, 1996; Hart and 
Saunders, 1997; Petersen et al., 2005), cannot be neglected. Trust on the other party is desired 
in order to minimize the risk that the other party behaves opportunistically. Hence, trust can 
play an important role when exchanging critical company information. For example, Bagchi 
and Skjoett-Larsen (2005) reported from a European survey that companies were cautious 
when sharing information. Similar claims were also made in the studies of Eng (2003), 
Kemppainen and Vepsäläinen (2003), Dekker (2003), and Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen (2002), 
and Akintoye et al. (2000) where resistance to sharing proprietary data was either found or 
argued. To overcome the fear of being exploited due to information sharing, a certain level of 
trust might be needed. Trust can be defined as “the willingness to rely on an exchange partner 
in whom one has confidence” (Moorman et al. 1992).  
 
In the commercial context, TCE refines the term trust and refers to calculative trust, where 
contractors, in the presence of incomplete contracts, carry out some form of cost – benefit 
analysis to assess the risks of contracting (Williamson 1996). Here, institutional trust becomes 
also relevant, which refers to the social and organizational context within which contracts are 
embedded (Williamson 1996). Institutional trust includes, among other things, sanctioning 
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mechanisms (such as through the implementation of the legal process), informal codes of 
conduct and values (Welter and Smallbone 2006), and professionalization. TCE does not 
adequately address trust in terms of how it forms between organizations and how it should be 
managed to sustain organizational effectiveness and efficiency (Ireland and Webb, 2006).  
 
Greater levels of trust increase the probability of a firm’s willingness to expand the 
amount of information shared through EDI (Hart and Saunders, 1997). According to Hart and 
Saunders (1997), trust between organizations in EDI implementations consists of competence 
(how efficiently information is processed), openness (the ability to listen and share new 
ideas), caring (joint goal setting and refraining from opportunism), and reliability (consistent 
behavior).  
 
The risk of opportunism becomes relatively more important when there is more at 
stake: when the NPV of a company’s future income is relatively large. This is the case when a 
company offers a unique product that faces low competition and can therefore generate high 
economic rents. To do so, companies must foresee future opportunities in advance so as to 
invest in the right products and capabilities on time. A company can do this successfully if it 
possesses unique knowledge about market conditions and future customer requirements, due 
to perhaps advanced business intelligence, capabilities and/or relational capital. Once 
companies start developing capabilities and products, it then becomes a matter of protecting 
this information so as to be able to reap the benefits of their future monopoly power as long as 
possible. Hence companies might be reluctant to share information at an early stage of the 
Product Life Cycle (development or growth stage), as this could lead to a relatively larger risk 
of opportunism. Wagner (2003) provides some evidence about this phenomenon. Wagner 
(2003) reported that there are patterns relating to the phase of integration efforts (e.g. product 
development stage) and the intensity of integration with suppliers. For example, the optics 
and precision industry (e.g. cameras, medical and surgical devices) tends to integrate only at a 
latter stage (industrial stage), as they often need to protect their know-how by avoiding 
integration at the R&D stage. Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen (2002) claim that companies in 
rapidly evolving industries prefer not to integrate but as the opportunistic behavior threat 
recedes with industry maturity, firms open up gradually. Also Fisher (1997) and Kaufman and 
Mohtadi (2003) argue that manufacturers with stable demand (which is the case when they are 
at a later stage of PLC) are more likely to share information. Thus, we propose the fifth 
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hypothesis based on the product life cycle stage of the focal company, which addresses the 
risk of information sharing with other companies.    
 
Hypothesis 5: The intensity of information shared with key suppliers is positively 
related to the product life cycle stage of the buyer. 
 
Finally, we propose that information sharing leads to better performance, which has 
been previously reported (Bagchi and Larsen, 2005; Petersen et al., 2005; Cassivi et al., 2004; 
Fröhlich and Westbrook 2001). However, we distinguish between 3 performance measures in 
the supply chain - for output, resource and flexibility as recommended in Beamon (1999). 
This leads to the following 3 hypotheses.   
 
Hypothesis 6a: The intensity of information shared with key suppliers is positively 
related to resource performance. 
Hypothesis 6b: The intensity of information shared with key suppliers is positively 
related to output performance. 
Hypothesis 6c: The intensity of information shared with key suppliers is positively 
related to flexibility performance. 
 
The proposed model is presented in Figure 1, where information sharing mediates the 
contingent factors and performance. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Data collection and research method 
 
Data was collected by a mail survey from Finnish and Swedish companies in 2006. 
Finland and Sweden are one of the most developed countries in terms of information 
technology and have been consistently ranked as one of the most competitive countries in the 
world (World Economic Forum 2009). The sample of Finnish companies was obtained from 
the Voitto database. The sample of Swedish companies was acquired from the largest 
companies in the Nordic countries database. The two databases were accessible from Hanken 
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School of Economics’ network. The selection criteria for the Finnish and Swedish companies 
were the following: 
 
 a turnover of 15 million EUR minimum (140.000 mskr for Sweden; 1 EUR = 9.27 
in May 2006) 
 manufacturing, assembly companies and companies which distribute or sell those 
products (distributors and retailers)  
 excluded raw material extractors as the key-supplier concept is less relevant to 
them  
 
The first criterion was chosen in order to limit the sample size. This was done in favor of 
large companies. Larger companies have more resources and the scale of operations justifies 
the use of more advanced information systems for collaboration, where cost saving incentives 
are more significant. Service companies (other than distributors and suppliers) were excluded 
from both Finnish and Swedish samples, as many of the issues related to manufacturing 
companies such as inventory optimization, obsolescence, and stockouts do not necessarily 
apply to service companies. 
 
The query returned 1170 companies from Finland, which were fully retained in the 
sample. For Sweden, the database returned 2581 companies, which was subsequently reduced 
to 1290 through random sampling (elimination). Hence, the final sample for Finland and 
Sweden (Finland: 1170, Sweden 1290) totaled 2460.  The respondent in the target companies 
was the purchasing manager. Purchasing managers were considered to have the most 
knowledge about suppliers and performance. Managers were appropriate as high-ranking 
respondents are more likely to provide reliable information than their subordinate ranks 
(Philips, 1981).     
 
Out of the 1170 Finnish questionnaires, a total of 134 were returned of which more 
than half were received in the first week. Three questionnaires were returned as undelivered. 
Fifteen responses were unusable as either data was missing or because the company was a 
subsidiary of a foreign company and as it mainly purchased from key suppliers within the 
group. The total response rate (134/1167) was 11.5%. The number of usable responses were 
n=119 for Finland. Regarding the 1290 questionnaires that were also sent by post to the 
Swedish companies, sixteen questionnaires were returned as undelivered bringing the sample 
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size down to 1274. Responses from Sweden totaled 130, out of which 28 could not be used 
mainly due to missing data or the respondent being a subsidiary of a foreign multinational. 
Nearly two thirds of the responses were received within the first week after the first responses 
started arriving. Most of the remaining responses arrived during the following two weeks. The 
number of usable responses were n=102. The response rate for Sweden (130/1274) was 
10.2%, about 1% lower than for Finland. A response rate of about 10% is considered 
acceptable especially given the fact that no reminders were sent. Similar studies obtained 
comparable or even lower response rates from the Nordic region (see, for example, Bagchi et 
al., 2007; Bagchi Skjoett-Larsen, 2005) and elsewhere (e.g. Li et al., 2006). 
 
The presence/absence of non-response bias was checked using t-statistics for independent 
samples. Each sample was divided according to early and late respondents. The responses 
were spread across 5 weeks. The cut-off point for early responses was the first week (first 
seven days), which allowed the remaining four weeks to be identified as the period of late 
responses. The ratio for the Finnish sample in terms of the number of companies in the two 
groups (early versus late respondent) was 68:51, whereas for the Swedish sample it was 
73:29. There were differences in the means of the constructs (e.g. the intensity of information 
sharing and performance was higher for the early respondents). However, the differences 
were insignificant according to a 95% confidence interval. Hence non-response bias was not 
found in both of the samples.     
 
 
Measurement of variables   
 
  All variables in the questionnaire except company background information and the 
product life cycle stage were measured on a 7-point Likert scale. In addition to the 
information sharing construct in the model, the respondents were also asked to indicate the 
exact type of information they provide to their suppliers (Table 1). We operationalized the 
model using pre-tested instruments. Environmental uncertainty and demand uncertainty were 
adopted from Hoque (2004) and Ho et al. (2005) respectively, where the measures have been 
found to perform well. However, as opposed to the original studies from which the measures 
originate, the indicators were considered to be constructive instead of reflective. This is 
further explained in the next section. The measure for buyer dependency was borrowed from 
Straub et al. (2004) and supplier dependency was subsequently developed based on the 
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former. The measure for product life cycle stage was adopted from Hoque and James (2000), 
where respondents were asked to estimate what percentage of their products were in the 
different stages of the product life cycle. The intensity of information sharing was borrowed 
from Li et al. (2006) consisting of six indicators. The measure for performance was adopted 
from Beamon (1999) supporting the view that a multidimensional scale should be used to 
capture the different characteristics of supply chain performance.  
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the positions of the respondents within the supply chain. Regarding the 
industries, when combined and in both samples, more than half of the respondents represented 
the materials, capital goods and technology industries. On the other hand, the retailing, health 
equipment, and pharmaceutical industries were the smallest groups among all the industries in 
both samples. Furthermore, about half of the companies’ turnover fell in the range of 49 to 15 
million Euros, whereas less than 10% of the companies had a turnover larger than 1 billion 
Euros. This was consistent for both samples. With respect to the usage of technologies for 
information sharing with key suppliers, ERPS, Web Portals and EDI were used by more than 
one third of the Finnish companies. Regarding the Swedish sample, only the use of EDI was 
as high. The use of ERPS and Web Portals was significantly lower (half less) compared to the 
Finnish sample. The category “Other Means” (e.g. telephone, fax, meetings) in Sweden 
(almost half of the respondents) was in comparison to Finland about twice as high. On the 
other hand the use of SRM software was very low (less than 5%) for both of the samples. 
Regarding supply chain practices, the differences between the two countries were smaller. 
Most common practices used by companies were supply chain planning and VMI (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Regarding information provided to key-suppliers (Table 1), demand forecast information 
ranked the highest in both countries. T-tests for the two independent samples indicated that 
information shared on demand forecasts was significantly different in the two countries. The 
results agree with Ollhager and Selldin (2004), where demand forecast was also found to be 
the highest among similar collaboration items. This may not be surprising as sharing demand 
forecast information is relatively harmless when compared to for example, R&D or promotion 
information, as well as, probably the most urgent to share.    
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Table 1: Information Provided to Buyers 
 
 
Finland 
Mean 
Scale: 1-7
Sweden 
Mean 
 
significance 
    
Demand forecasts 4.81 5.61 ** 
Production plans 4.28 4.71 no 
Production capacity 4.13 4.53 no 
Inventory status 4.08 4.13 no 
Product design  3.82 4.50 no 
R&D information/plans 3.54 3.42 no 
Promotion/campaign plans 3.42 2.81 no 
Customer information (e.g. POS data) 2.35 2.77 no 
Warehouse/transp. system access 1.89 2.53 no 
** significant at p<0.01 
 
 
We also checked whether there were any differences based on the respondents’ position in the 
supply chain and the extent of information shared with key suppliers. For this purpose, three 
groups were compared, i.e. manufacturers, wholesalers/distributors, and retailers. T-tests 
showed no significant differences among the three groups. The same test was also done for 
the two dependence variables (key supplier dependency and buyer dependency) but also here 
the differences were insignificant according to a 95% confidence interval. This was the case 
for both of the samples.  
 
 
Statistical analysis and results 
 
Tests were initially performed for individual samples in order to see differences 
between countries. Confirmatory factor analysis was performed for reflective constructs, 
which were dependency and performance. All factor analyses were based on the principal axis 
factoring direct oblimin rotation method. Oblimin rotation was used as high correlations 
between indicators were expected and found. Only components with an Eigenvalue above one 
were retained. Pairwise deletion for missing values was used and no large outliers were found 
in the data, which could otherwise lead to skewed results. This was verified by comparing the 
5% trimmed mean values with the non-trimmed mean values, which were very close.   
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The results of the factor analysis for the reflective measures (performance, supplier-, 
buyer dependency, information sharing) are presented in Appendix 1. Although, the 
dimensions for the performance measures were known from Cassivi et al. (2004), an 
exploratory factor analysis on all the items in the three dimensions was performed. This had 
not been done before. The factor analysis resulted in three components, consistent with the 
number of underlying dimensions (resource, output, flexibility). However, the indicators were 
not exactly clustered as according to the given dimensions. Loadings and scale reliabilities 
(Cronbach’s alpha) were sufficient (loadings > 0.3, Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7). The mean scores 
for on-time delivery, flexibility to deliver, and stock-out costs were particularly high, 
indicating that a substantial improvement on the said items had been perceived by companies 
as a result of information shared. Factor analysis for supplier dependency was satisfactory, 
which resulted in a single component with high loadings and Cronbach’s alpha. Factor 
analysis on buyer dependency returned one component as expected. One indicator, specific 
investments into machinery or procedures was dropped as it loaded low on the construct. The 
scale reliability for the construct was high. For demand uncertainty, no factor analysis was 
required as the construct was considered to be formative. This is the case when indicators 
forming the construct can have different antecedents and do not necessarily correlate, e.g. the 
number of sales channels with the lead times of the products. Nevertheless, to support this 
claim, factor analysis was performed, which resulted in three components indicating the 
multidimensionality of the data. Ho et al. (2005), who developed the demand uncertainty 
construct found four components in an explorative factor analysis with the same indicators, 
which they labeled as channel characteristics, product characteristics, demand forecast, and 
demand change. However, Ho et al. (2005) in the study used the indicators as reflective, 
where the results were satisfactory. To further explore the data, correlations between the 
demand uncertainty indicators were computed. For the majority of the correlations, Pearson 
correlation coefficients were found to be low (0.10 – 0.29), which also supports the argument 
that the indicators form rather than reflect the construct. Factor analysis on intensity of 
information sharing returned one component with high loadings and good reliability (see 
Appendix 6). Environmental uncertainty as a construct was perceived as a formative 
construct. Ho et al. (2005) used the indicators as reflective although the indicators do not 
necessarily have common antecedents, e.g. uncertainty in production and information 
technologies and market activities of competitors. A correlation analysis showed that the 
items correlated weakly, which also supports this claim. Similar and satisfactory results were 
also obtained for the Swedish sample.  
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Partial Least Squares Modeling 
 
The partial least squares (using PLS-graph version 3.00) approach to structural 
equation modeling was used to test the hypothesized relationships for the two samples. The 
demand uncertainty and environmental uncertainty constructs were set as formative, whereas 
supplier dependency, buyer dependency, information sharing, and performance were set as 
reflective and as according to the components of the factor analysis. The results of the model 
for the Finnish sample is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
In PLS, the measurement model is evaluated according to item loadings, reliability 
coefficients, convergent, and discriminant validity. Item loadings exceeding 0.7 are 
considered adequate (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) for reflective indicators. For formative 
indicators, the weights not the loadings are taken into consideration. Composite reliability, 
which is interpreted like Cronbach’s alpha for internal consistency reliability is considered 
adequate when greater than 0.7 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE), a measure indicating how much the indicators explain the variance in the construct is 
acceptable when it exceeds 0.5 (Barclay, Thompson, and Higgins, 1995). Discriminant 
validity is assessed by verifying that items across constructs have minimum correlations than 
with the corresponding construct. 
 
Appendix 2 presents the results for the measurement (outer) model in terms of item 
loadings, AVE, and composite reliability. All item loadings for the reflective indicators 
except product quality and personnel requirements were satisfactory, exceeding 0.7 (see Table 
2). AVE and composite reliability were sufficient for all reflective constructs. Discriminant 
validity was checked by comparing the square roots of AVE to construct correlations. The 
correlations were all smaller than the square roots of AVE indicating that a construct shared 
more variance with its measures than with other constructs (see Appendix 2). The strengths of 
the relationships (betas) and R squares are shown in Figures 4 and 5. In PLS, for testing the fit 
of the model, in addition to AVE values, t-statistics for the path coefficients must be checked. 
For this purpose, bootstrapping with 500 samples was generated.  
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Uncertainty and information sharing (H1 and H2) 
 
According to the t-statistics for the Finnish sample (see Appendix 2), demand and 
environmental uncertainties had a significant and positive relationship with the intensity of 
information shared with key suppliers. Regarding demand uncertainty, the weights of the 
formative indicators were the highest for the product to market cycle and changes in order 
content. The negative weight for the product to market cycle was unexpected, which might 
mean that as product to market cycles times get longer, companies see little value in sharing 
information with suppliers. However, with increasing pressures to bring products to markets 
faster, Finnish companies are finding it useful to collaborate with their suppliers. On the other 
hand, the same indicator weight in the Swedish sample was positive, which reverses the 
argument: perhaps more information is shared as complex products with longer product to 
market cycle times require a higher level of supply chain planning and collaboration. For 
environmental uncertainty, government regulation and production and IT had the largest 
weights, which are factors that companies can hardly estimate themselves.      
 
These overall results for hypotheses one and two were consistent with the theoretical 
framework of the paper, which argued that companies strive at minimizing uncertainty as this 
enables better decision making. The results agree with Zhou and Benton (2007), where supply 
chain dynamism was found to be significantly related to information sharing. However supply 
chain dynamism in Zhou and Benton (2007) referred to only the rate of product innovation, 
which in comparison to the uncertainty constructs in this study was narrow in focus. The 
results also agree with the hypothesis in Li and Lin (2006). However, unlike in Li and Lin 
(2006), the results were all significant and positively related to information sharing (including 
supplier uncertainty).   
 
Dependency and information sharing (H3) and (H4) 
 
According to the t-statistics (see Appendix 2), key supplier dependency and buyer 
dependency had a significant and positive relationship with the intensity of information 
shared with key suppliers. This can be interpreted in many ways: as companies become more 
dependent on each other, they might want to improve their relationship and to gain each 
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others trust, which could be possibly achieved through some kind of collaboration. Another 
explanation could be that as buyers become more dependent (because of for example 
increasing asset specific investments) on their key suppliers, suppliers are able to demand 
more information from their buyers. It might also be the case that, as buyers become more 
dependent on their suppliers, buyers are willing to “pay” for more information by, for 
example, financing the implementation of integrated information systems and by providing 
free consulting. These kinds of “gestures” however cannot guarantee the sharing of 
information, especially of a strategic nature. The same logic can also be applied to a 
supplier’s dependency on the buyer: Powerful buyers can force smaller suppliers to act in 
their own interest, which might conflict with suppliers’ interests. To give an example of 
extreme buyer power, Wal-Mart, the biggest retailer in the world, was in the position to 
demand from its key suppliers to have all supplied products to be tagged with Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) (Hoffman, 2005). If this mandate was not met by a certain 
date, Wal-Mart threatened to abandon or fine them. The reason for this mandate was that Wal-
Mart saw RFID tags, which help track goods as they move along the supply chain, as an 
important cost reducing technology. The implementation of RFID was however seen to be too 
costly for some suppliers, which operate with low margins.   
 
PLC stage and information sharing (H5) 
 
The relationship between the PLC stage and information sharing was slightly positive 
but not significant. For this hypothesis, the relationship was also tested for curve linearity but 
this neither yielded significance. One explanation could be the possible deficiency of the 
proxy measure for risk. It might have been better to focus on information sharing at different 
stages of a company’s PLC as in Wagner (2003) rather than at the company level. The 
measure used in this study was perhaps too general.  
 
Information sharing and performance (H6) 
 
Hypothesis 6 was supported, as a positive relationship between information sharing 
and the three performance measures was found. This was consistent with previous studies 
(e.g. Li et al., 2006; Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen, 2005; Petersen et al., 2005; Saeed et al., 
2005) and the theoretical argumentation of this study: Information sharing reduces uncertainty 
and improves decision-making. The strongest relationship was found between information 
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sharing and output. This was expected. Whereas information sharing reduces the bullwhip 
effect and relatively swiftly impacts customer satisfaction, on-time delivery, etc.  (output 
performance), resource (or flexibility) improvements in, for example, personnel requirements 
and operational costs, might take longer and are also somewhat less obvious to all the 
personnel. In some cases, the benefits of information sharing might take rather long, that is, 
when, for example, new capital budgeting decisions based on enhanced information 
availability are implemented. 
 
The results for the Swedish sample are in Figure 5 and in Appendix 2 
(loadings/weights, AVE, and t-statistics). The results were similar. All the hypotheses except 
H5 were supported. Also, direct and saturated models were tested to compare with the 
proposed model. Results gave support that the proposed model was better than alternative 
models.     
 
Figure 5 here 
 
Since the results from the two samples were similar, it was appropriate to pool the data. The 
results were similar to country specific results. All hypotheses were supported except for the 
relationship between PLC and information sharing. The loadings, AVE, and composite 
reliability scores, were above the minimum threshold and were therefore satisfactory. R 
squared for the first part (determinants) of the model was 0.22 and for the second part 
(consequences) 0.168, 0.226, and 0.112, where the average R squared was 0.182. Regarding 
the first part of the model, the values were clearly higher for the country specific values 
(Finland 0.34, Sweden 0.29). Hence, pooling the data lead to a loss in variance explained. For 
the second part of the model, R squared for the pooled data was an average of the values 
obtained for each country. The summary of the results in terms of which hypotheses were 
supported and which were not is given in Table 2.      
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Table 2: Summary of the results 
Hypoth. Nr. Hypothesis Support 
H1 Environmental uncertainty is positively related 
to the intensity of information shared with key 
suppliers. 
Yes 
H2 Demand uncertainty is positively related to the 
intensity of information shared with key 
suppliers.  
Yes 
H3 A key supplier’s dependence on the buyer is 
positively related to the intensity of information 
shared with key supplier.  
Yes 
H4 A buyer’s dependence on the key supplier is 
positively related to the intensity of information 
shared with the key supplier. 
Yes 
H5 The intensity of information shared with key 
suppliers is positively related to the product life 
cycle stage of the buyer.  
No 
H6a 
 
 
H6b 
 
H6c 
The intensity of information shared with key 
suppliers is positively related to resource 
performance. 
The intensity of information shared with key 
suppliers is positively related to output 
performance 
The intensity of information shared with key 
suppliers is positively related to flexibility 
performance. 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to find out what factors determine information sharing 
between companies, which is a desired but in practice, a limited phenomenon. The study 
developed a model using the transaction cost theory framework to explain information sharing 
in a buyer supplier context. The model was separately tested with data from 119 Finnish and 
102 Swedish companies. The results indicated that uncertainty (both demand and 
environmental), and dependency had explanatory power (positive relationships) for the level 
of information shared with key suppliers, whereas the product life cycle stage of the focal 
company was found not to be significant. This study makes theoretical and methodological 
contributions by extending on a number of studies including, Zhou and Benton (2007), Li and 
Lin (2006), and Bagchi and Larsen (2002). This is so with respect to the hypotheses on the 
relationship between uncertainty and information sharing, which were previously 
unsupported. There is also a contribution to transaction cost theory by investigating whether 
asset specificity and switching costs (dependency) play a role in interorganizational 
information sharing. The results confirm Dyer (1996) and Williamson (1991), that asset 
specificity encourages integration, although not only in the sense of vertical integration. One 
of the methodological highlights of the study was to use formative indicators as opposed to 
reflective indicators for demand and environmental uncertainty, which had not been done 
before. This study also confirmed previous results with respect to information sharing leading 
to better firm performance especially regarding output.  
 
As for the limitations of this study, first of all, only the buyer’s perspective was 
investigated. Future studies should also include key suppliers or multiple parties in the supply 
chain. Furthermore, since a single respondent answered all the questions in the survey, the 
likelihood of common method bias has to be taken into account. Another limitation or 
weakness of the study is the low response rate. Although comparable to similar studies in the 
Nordic Region, reminders for completing the survey would have improved the response rate. 
However, no reminders were sent out to the companies.  
   
The overall results shed descriptive light on a common trend in supply chains today. 
Companies continue to adopt supply chain technologies and practices. However, being 
contingent on the factors discussed in this study, information sharing is limited and selective. 
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Clearly, there are many research possibilities in this field. More research can be done on other 
factors that might influence information sharing between companies and perhaps factors that 
are moderating this relationship. This would complement theory and thus lead to a better 
understanding of the topic. For example, a factor of interest to research might be absorptive 
capacity: “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate 
it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity might 
mediate the relationship between information sharing and performance. This topic would also 
benefit from case study research, where only a few exist (some examples are Bagchi and 
Skjoett-Larsen, 2002; Cassivi et al., 2004). Qualitative information from case studies could 
provide more insight and depth for discussions and interpretation, which are so far based on, 
primarily, quantitative data. 
 
Having confirmed that transaction cost theory can be used as a lens to view 
interorganizational information sharing, it might be interesting to look at more specific and/or 
strategic types of practices such as interorganizational cost management through the use of 
integrated measurement systems and interorganizational teams. However such practices might 
be relatively uncommon. Thus, multiple case studies might be more appropriate for this kind 
of research. In addition, longitudinal studies would provide insight into the practices of firms, 
using alternative lenses such as the old institutional economics, which focuses upon processes 
rather than outcomes.  
 
More practitioner-oriented research could be valuable too. For example, how can a 
cost – benefit analysis be carried out for the purpose of integration? How can the risk of 
opportunism be quantified versus benefits of integration? This would help firms make more 
efficient and effective choices when evaluating integration opportunities with other firms. 
 
 
Managerial implications 
     
Despite the many uncertainties they face, companies have to constantly make critical 
business decisions such as in which future capabilities and products to invest as well as what 
and how much to produce. Sound decision making requires access to timely and accurate 
information. For this purpose, companies can turn to their supply chain partners for valuable 
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information, knowledge, and coordination. Sharing forecasts, trends, and plans can reduce, 
among others, stock outs, obsolescence, inventory and logistics costs. So, practitioners might 
want to reconsider the importance of working more closely with their exchange partners in 
order to maintain and improve their competitiveness. Furthermore, information sharing 
between supply chain partners is a relatively easy and cost-effective solution against 
uncertainty when compared to alternatives such as adding buffers, flexibility, and capacity to 
the supply chain. 
 
Information sharing requires that the exchange partners clearly see the advantages of 
collaboration. This requires an initiator, who can effectively communicate with the involved 
parties. A powerful exchange partner with high influence on the supply chain can better 
accomplish such a task (Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen, 2002). A reputable and powerful 
exchange partner can also help build confidence and trust into the initiative by showing 
commitment and determination. Thus, as long as the parties act fairly and power is not 
abused, power can act as a positive force in the supply chain.  
 
The lack of trust is seen as an impediment to information sharing (Kemppainen and 
Vepsäläinen, 2003; Akintoye et al., 2000; Dekker, 2003 and Bagchi and Skjoett-Larsen, 2002, 
2005). This is not surprising as the sharing of critical company information might carry the 
risk of opportunism or information spill-over. Thus, if a partner expects opportunistic 
behavior, it can withhold or exchange inaccurate information so that information in no longer 
valuable (Inkpen, 2001). Companies might also perceive the sharing of private information as 
a threat to their bargaining power and might therefore withhold information (Kaufman and 
Mohtadi, 2003). Whereas, a certain level of trust could possibly be achieved over time, 
through refraining from opportunistic behavior, the perceived loss of power is more difficult 
to solve. Furthermore, because information can be viewed as an asset, companies might not 
want to give it away for free, unless they are compensated. One solution could be the 
negotiation of the terms of compensation in advance, although it might be hard to quantify the 
exact stakes. Also, selective collaboration with the most trusted partners could be a good 
strategy to follow so as to keep the risk of opportunism at minimum.     
 
Given that the involved parties understand the potential for mutual benefit (although 
their magnitude might differ), the companies are likely to engage in information sharing. For 
example, if order variability is a problem, the companies could begin to collaborate by sharing 
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demand forecast data, what today, as the results of this study suggest, many companies 
already do. Once the companies begin to realize the benefits (e.g. through smaller order 
variance) of information sharing, more advanced forms of collaboration can follow. 
Moreover, collaboration will become even more effective when similar initiatives are carried 
out at different exchange points along the supply chain, gradually leading to supply chain 
management in a true sense.   
  
A drawback of information sharing but more so process integration is the likelihood of 
intensifying interdependencies between companies, e.g. as a result of dedicated IT systems 
(Teo et al., 2003) or relying too much on one key supplier. The drawbacks and risks to 
information sharing can be to some extent mitigated if a more cautious approach is followed. 
This would involve a gradual and step by step approach to adopting promoted solutions and 
practices, weighing carefully costs and benefits and avoiding hasty implementations that 
follow trends.          
   
Collaboration and information sharing is a relational phenomenon and means more 
than setting up physical communication linkages between companies. This may also explain 
why collaboration is not as extensive as one would expect, given the recent attention this topic 
has received from both academia and industry. Often, companies tend to focus on the 
applications of IT on SCM but do not give enough attention to the development of interfirm 
relationships (Li and Lin 2006). Thus, the building of trust, commitment, and shared vision is 
crucial. Trust, commitment, and shared vision not only increase information shared but also 
improves its quality (Li and Lin 2006).  However, trust in itself is not the motivation for 
information sharing but it is the benefit that companies expect from it. Thus, trust can be seen 
as a risk minimizing factor whereas uncertainty and dependency motivate and increase the 
pay-off. Hence, the level of uncertainty and dependency between companies determine 
collaboration intensity because with increasing uncertainty and dependency, companies are 
likely to benefit more from collaboration through streamlining the supply chain and better 
safeguarding their assets. Therefore, comparisons and benchmarking should be done with 
caution as the level of information sharing and collaboration need not be high across all 
supply chains.          
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Factor Analysis – Performance – Confirmatory - Finland 
Factor Loading Variance 
Expl.
Cronbach’s 
Alpha
Item Mean 
Scale: 1-7 
Stand. Dev. 
Resource Measures  49% 0.813   
energy use 0.756   2.43 1.29 
equipment utilization 0.736   3.47 1.48 
operational costs 0.734   4.30 1.36 
inventory turnover 0.662   4.58 1.47 
personnel 0.584   3.19 1.55 
Output Measures  56% 0.841   
on-time delivery  0.901   5.10 1.49 
customer satisfaction 0.869   4.92 1.56 
fill rates 0.780   4.15 1.68 
stock-out costs 0.710   5.02 1.45 
product quality 0.339   3.84 1.63 
Flexibility Measures  50% 0.723   
new product introd. 0.897   3.89 1.68 
product variety 0.687   3.53 1.68 
flexibility to deliver 0.475   5.18 1.37 
 
Factor Analysis - Supplier Dependence - Finland 
Factor Loading Variance 
Expl. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Item Mean 
Scale: 1-7 
Stand. Dev. 
Supp. Depend.  66% 0.828   
monetary costs 0.960   4.15 1.74 
search costs 0.869   3.89 1.76 
specific investm. 0.542   3.66 1.73 
 
Factor Analysis - Buyer Dependence - Finland 
Factor Loading Variance 
Expl. 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Item Mean 
Scale: 1-7 
Stand. Dev. 
Buyer Depend.  56% 0.893   
monetary costs 0.991   4.43 1.54 
search, contr. costs 0.811   4.16 1.55 
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Factor Analysis - Information Sharing –Finland 
 
Factor Loading Variance Expl. Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Item Mean 
Scale: 1-7 
Stand. Dev. 
Inf. Sha.  49% 0.868   
processes 0.792   4.25 1.39 
informed 0.724   4.04 1.52 
proprietary (1) 0.695   3.74 1.65 
proprietary (2) 0.690   3.98 1.36 
issues 0.688   4.87 1.15 
needs 0.676   5.30 1.20 
planning 0.642   4.13 1.45 
KMO: 0.79, Barlett’s Test: significant 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Model – Finland (T-statistics) 
 
 InfoSha. Resour. Output Flexib. DemUn. Supdep. Buydep. ExtUn. PLC
InfoSha. 0 0 0 0 3.9595 2.1431 2.9244 3.154 0.5794
Resou. 7.9926 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Output 10.0784 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flexib. 5.0297 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DemUn. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Supdep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Buydep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ExtUn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PLC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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The Outer Model - Finland 
Factors l/(w) AVE Comp. Rel.
Demand Uncertainty   NA  NA
rate of product introductions (0.107)
product demand (-0.131)
short life cycle times (0.413)
large product variety (0.245)
sales channels (-0.024)
product to market cycle time (-0.602)
frequent orders (-0.255)
changes in order content (0.424)
orders expedited frequently (0.363)
lead times of products (0.283)
Environm. Uncertainty   NA  NA
supplier’s actions (0.024)
customer demands (-0.121)
deregulation and globalization (-0.276)
competitors (-0.062)
production and IT (0.396)
government regulation (0.877)
economic environment (0.054)
industrial relations (-0.138)
Supplier Dependency 0.735 0.893
lost sales 0.894
searching effort 0.883
asset specific investments 0.791
Buyer Dependency 0.899 0.947
monetary cost  0.947
effort 0.950
Product Life Cycle 
Intensity of Information Sharing  0.564 0.900
proprietary (1) 0.745
needs 0.730
proprietary (2) 0.738
informed 0.726
processes 0.806
planning 0.727
events 0.779
Perform. resource 0.628 0.832
equipment utilization 0.874
energy use 0.852
product quality 0.627
Perform. output 0.627 0.921
inventory turnover 0.683
operational costs  0.793
stock-out costs 0.763
fill rates  0.766
on-time delivery  0.898
flexibility to deliver 0.777
customer satisfaction 0.833
Perform. flexibility  0.642 0.843
personnel requirements 0.772
product variety 0.826
new product introductions 0.805
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NA: Not applicable 
 
Model – Sweden (T-statistics) 
 InfoSha. Flexib. Output Resource DemUn. Supdep. Buydep. ExtUn. PLC
InfoSha. 0 0 0 0 3.747 2.0611 2.3465 2.7627 1.4328
Flexib. 3.2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Output 4.2898 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Resource 3.5608 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DemUn. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Supdep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Buydep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ExtUn. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PLC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
 
The Outer Model - Sweden  
Factors l/(w) AVE Comp. Rel.
Demand Uncertainty      NA
rate of product introductions (0.641)
product demand (-0.080)
short life cycle times (-0.353)
large product variety (0.381)
sales channels (0.207)
product to market cycle time (0.257)
frequent orders (0.001)
changes in order content (0.173)
orders expedited frequently (-0.030)
lead times of products (-0.012)
Environm. Uncertainty  NA    NA
supplier’s actions (-0.941)
customer demands (0.380)
deregulation and globalization (-0.020)
competitors (0.126)
production and IT (0.027)
government regulation (0.184)
economic environment (0.497)
industrial relations (-0.155)
Supplier Dependency  0.89 0.947
lost sales 0.933
searching effort 0.963
asset specific invest.*  
Buyer Dependency  0.66 0.857
monetary cost  0.854
effort 0.909
asset specific invest. 0.671
Information Sharing  0.57 0.904
proprietary (1) 0.699
needs 0.766
proprietary (2) 0.755
informed 0.808
processes 0.687
planning 0.824
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events 0.751
Perform Resource  0.71 0.880
energy use 0.810
oper. costs 0.868
equipm. utiliz. 0.848
Perform Output  0.57 0.888
On-time del. 0.835
flex. to del. 0.809
cust. satisf. 0.825
fill rates 0.779
inv. turnover 0.656
stock-out costs 0.603
pers. requirem.*  
Perform Flexibility  0.79 0.919
prod. variety 0.911
new prod. intro. 0.912
prod. quality 0.842
* discarded as it loaded 0.598 in PLS 
NA: Not applicable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
